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Abstract
We investigate government subsidy policies in which a home firm and a foreign firm choose to
strategically set prices or quantities in a third market. We show that even though each firm can
earn higher profits under Cournot competition than under Bertrand competition regardless of the
nature of goods, choosing Bertrand competition is the dominant strategy for both firms. This can
lead each firm to face a prisoners’ dilemma in equilibrium. We also show that from the aspects of
governments under subsidy regime, Cournot competition is more efficient than Bertrand competi-
tion when the goods are substitutes, and vice versa when the goods are complements. However,
trade liberalization such as via free trade agreements brings about a change in the competition
mode from Bertrand competition to Cournot competition if goods are substitutes. On the other
hand, if goods are complements, there are no such a change in the competition mode and Bertrand
competition prevails the market. Hence, a move toward free trade among countries increases not
only profits of firms but also the welfare of both countries irrespective of the nature of goods.
JEL Classification: F12, F13, L13.
Keywords: Subsidy, Cournot, Bertrand, Social Welfare, Prisoners’ Dilemma.
1 Introduction
The analysis of strategic trade policy has attracted much attention since the beginning of the 1980s. As
is often the case in an international trade, the theory of strategic export policy for oligopolies started
with a pioneering work by Brander and Spencer (1985). In their model, a domestic government first
decides upon an export subsidy, and then a domestic firm and a foreign firm compete in a third market.
Brander and Spencer (1985) showed that an export subsidy was optimal under Cournot competition,
whereas Eaton and Grossman (1986) demonstrated that an export tax was optimal under Bertarnd
competition on the third market1. Recently, Clarke and Collie (2003) analysed the welfare effects
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1For more detailed discussion of subsidy policy, see Dixit and Kyle (1985), Horstmann and Markusen (1986), Cooper
and Riezman (1989), Brainard and Martimort (1997), Hwang and Mai (2007), and Brander (1995) and references therein.
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of free trade in the Bertrand competition with product differentiation. The main stream focuses
on extensions and generalizations of Brander and Spencer (1985) and Eaton and Grossman (1986).
Among them are de Meza (1986), Bandyopadhyay (1997), Neary and Leahy (2000), Collie and de
Meza (2003), Clarke and Collie (2006).
Although previous works considered strategic export policy, the existing literature on international
trade paid relatively little attention to the endogenous choice of strategic variables for prices or quan-
tities with subsidy or tax regime. In fact, since our issue was addressed in the industrial organization
context, the potential impact of government subsidy policy was not theoretically incorporated. Key
paper in this area includes Singh and Vives (1984). They were the first to analyze this issue and to
show, from the standpoint of consumer surplus and social welfare, that Bertrand competition is more
efficient than Cournot competition regardless of the nature of goods. They also showed that when
goods are substitutes, Cournot equilibrium profits are higher than Bertrand equilibrium profits, and
vice versa, when goods are complements. In the industrial organization context, many strands of the
literature have produced an array of extensions and generalizations of the analysis in Singh and Vives
(1984). For example, one strand that focuses on extensions and generalizations of their study, Dastidar
(1997), Qiu (1997), Lambertini (1997), Hackner (2000), and Zanchettin (2006) reveals counter-results
based on the original framework by allowing for a wider range of cost and demand asymmetries.
Under the framework of the strategic trade policies, with comparisons of Bertrand and Cournot
competition, the only exceptions, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, are Cheng (1988), Bagwell
and Staiger (1994), Maggi (1996), Schroeder and Tremblay (2014) and Ghosh and Pal (2014) where
the endogenous choice of strategic variables is not provided2. Cheng (1988) derived the optimal tariff
and production subsidy under Cournot and Bertrand competition with differentiated products and
showed that the optimal tariff is lower under Bertrand competition than under Cournot competition.
Moreover, Maggi (1996) showed that capacity subsidy is generally a welfare improving policy regardless
of the competition mode and Bagwell and Staiger (1994) indicated that R&D subsidies might also be
the best policy in both Cournot and Bertrand setups. Schroeder and Tremblay (2014) investigated
the welfare effect of an export subsidy/tax in the third market, where the home government chooses
subsidy and other countries are assumed to be policy inactive by considering all strategic possibilities
(Cournot versus Bertrand versus Bertrand-Cournot versus Cournot-Bertrand). Finally, Ghosh and
Pal (2014) analyzed strategic trade policy in differentiated network goods oligopoly only comparing
Cournot versus Bertrand competition. The present paper fills this gap. Thus, we address how the
endogenous choice of strategic variables for prices or quantities affects social welfare and firm’s profit
when a home firm and a foreign firm compete in a third market, comparing the strategic trade
policies with free trade. Notably, the present study differs from previous ones that do not consider
the endogenous choice of strategic variables for prices or quantities in a third market with strategic
export policy.
The main result of our paper is that regardless of the nature of goods, even though each firm can
earn higher profits under Cournot competition than under Bertrand competition, choosing Bertrand
competition is the dominant strategy for home and foreign firms when both firms export to a third-
country market with strategic trade policies. A higher (less) export subsidy (tax) forces both firms
2Kikuchi (1998) explored how optimal export policies are affected by the nature of competition mode (Cournot or
Bertrand) with a home firm only under subsidy regime.
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to be aggressive in determining the output, which leads to be higher output and lower price under
choosing price variable regardless of what the rival firm chooses competition mode. Thus, each firm
prefers choosing price variable to choosing quantity variable regardless of the nature of goods. However,
this leads, in equilibrium, each firm to face a prisoners’ dilemma regardless of the nature of goods
(except for the case where goods are highly complement). This intuition is as follows. Since the effect
on a higher price with lower output under Cournot competition dominates the effect on a lower price
with a higher output under Bertrand competition, each firm could obtain higher profit under Cournot
competition than under Bertrand competition.
We also show that from the aspects of governments under subsidy or tax regime, Cournot com-
petition is more efficient than Bertrand competition when the goods are substitutes, and vice versa
when the goods are complements. For this, from the aspects of firms, the equilibrium could be Pareto
superior (inferior) with government’s intervention of subsidy policy when the goods are substitutes
(complements). However, from the free trade equilibrium, it is straightforward to verify that the
dominant strategy for firms is to choose Cournot competition when the goods are substitutes, and
vice versa when the goods are complements. Hence, trade liberalization among countries may cause a
shift in the competition mode from Bertrand-type to Cournot-type competition especially when goods
are substitutes and that Bertrand model should be used more in the analysis of strategic trade policy.
Finally, comparing the equilibrium outcomes in the presence of optimal trade policies with that under
free trade, if the goods are complements, the contract mode does not change as trade liberalization
progresses and thus Bertrand competition prevails markets (i.e., both countries’ welfare would be
better off if they could cooperate so as to achieve the free trade regime). On the other hand, if goods
are substitutes, we find that firms’ equilibrium profits increase by the regime shift from Bertrand to
Cournot competition due to the trade liberalization. Consequently, as to welfare change due to the
regime shift of competition mode, a move toward free trade among countries increases not only profits
of firms but also the welfare of both countries irrespective of the nature of goods.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the third-market model. Section 3 analyzes
market equilibrium with competition mode under subsidy regime. Section 4 determines choice of
competition mode under subsidy regime. Section 5 analyzes the effect of free trade, considering
subsidy regime. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
Following Brander and Spencer (1985), we use the third-market model of international trade under
oligopolistic competition. We analyze the market for a differentiated good that is produced by two
firms (firm 1 and 2), each located in a different country, i.e., country 1 and country 2. These firms
compete in a third-country market, i.e., all of their output is exported to a third-country market3.
The inverse demand functions for good i can be written as follows:
pi = 1− xi − bxj ; i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j, (1a)
3The third-country market assumption implies that consumer surplus does not enter the home country’s welfare
function and this allows us to focus on the strategic interaction between the firms in the international oligopoly.
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where pi and xi are firm i’s price and quantity respectively. And the parameter b(∈ (−1, 1)) denotes
the type of interaction (substitutability or complementarity) between good i and good j. That is,
the goods are substitutes, independent, or complements according to whether b is positive, zero, or
negative, respectively. The corresponding direct demand function is given by
xi =
1− b− pi + bpj
1− b2 ; i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j. (1b)
Without loss of generality, we assume zero marginal production costs. Let si be the exports subsidy
per unit of output received by firm i. Then the exporting firm’s profits are given by
pii = (pi + si)xi; i, j = 1, 2. (2)
As there is no domestic consumption, welfare of country i, denoted Wi, consists only of the profits of
firm minus the loss of the subsidy:
Wi = pii − sixi; i, j = 1, 2. (3)
This study considers the case where each firm can make two types of binding contracts with consumers,
the price contract and the quantity contract, as described by Singh and Vives (1984). In order to
endogenize whether firms choose the price contract or the quantity contract, we consider a three-
stage game. In the first stage, each firm determines whether to adopt the price contract or the
quantity contract as a strategic variable. Since each firm has two strategic variables, there are basically
three possible subgames: both choose quantity contracts (quantity-quantity game), both choose price
contracts (price-price game), and one firm (firm 1) chooses the price contract while the other firm
(firm 2) chooses quantity contract (price-quantity game)4. In the second stage, after observing the
mode of competition determined in the first stage, two governments simultaneously set the optimal
tax/subsidy to maximize its social welfare. In the third stage, each exporting firm chooses its quantity
or price simultaneously in order to maximize its profits.
3 Market Equilibriums in the Second and Third Stages
Following the backward induction method, we first solve the firms’ profit maximization problem under
each subgame.
[The quantity-quantity game]
This is basically Cournot simultaneous game. In this case the problem of firm i(i = 1, 2) in the third
stage is maxxi pii(xi, xj ; si), which yields its quantity reaction function as R
C
i (xj ; si) = (1− bxj + si)/2
where the superscript ‘C’ denotes the Cournot competition. We find that RCi (xj ; si) is negatively
(positively) related to xj in the quantity space, if b is positive (negative). By solving the system of the
two reaction functions, we get equilibrium prices, quantities, and profits under Cournot competition
4Because firms i and j are symmetric in terms of their cost structure, both the (price-quantity) game and (quantity-
price) game produce the same results.
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mode as a function of si and sj ;
pCi (si, sj) =
2− b− (2− b2)si − bsj
4− b2 , x
C
i (si, sj) =
2− b− bsj + 2si
4− b2 , (4)
piCi (si, sj) = pii[x
C
i (si, sj), x
C
j (si, sj); si] =
[
xCi (si, sj)
]2
. (5)
Substituting these equilibrium prices and quantities into the welfare expression we get
WCi (si, sj) = pii[x
C
i (si, sj), x
C
j (si, sj); si]− sixCi (si, sj). (6)
Therefore, in the second stage, the problem of each government can be written as maxsi W
C
i (si, sj).
Differentiate WCi with respect to si to get:
dWCi
dsi
=
dpii
dxj
dxCj
dsi
− sidx
C
i
dsi
=
b2
4− b2x
C
i −
2si
4− b2 (> 0 when si = 0), (7)
where the term dpii/dxj in the second part of the equation represents the effects of the rival firm’s
market action (here, it is quantity change) on the home firm’s profits and dxCi /dsi is the equilibrium
output change of the rival firm caused by an export subsidy while the second term si(dx
C
i /dsi) repre-
sents the subsidy payments increase due to the home firm’s output change caused by export subsidy.
The key finding is that, irrespective of whether goods are substitutes or complements, the combined
term (dpii/dxj)(dx
C
j /dsi), the cross effect of export subsidy on profits via rival’s output change, is
positive. This implies that, in the neighborhood of free trade (si = 0), the cross effects of export
subsidy are greater than the subsidy payments, and thus, a marginal increase in the subsidy increases
the social welfare. Setting dWCi /dsi = 0 to obtain the reaction function of the government yields
si(sj) = [b
2(2− b)− b3sj ]/4(2− b2). Because of symmetry, i.e., si = sj = s, the optimal subsidy in the
Cournot competition is given by
sCi = s
C
j = s
C =
b2
4 + 2b− b2 > 0. (8)
Substituting the equilibrium value of export subsidy, Eq. (8), into equations from Eq. (4) to Eq. (6)
we get the equilibrium prices, quantities, profits and social welfare in the Cournot competition mode.
The following lemma is immediate.
Lemma 1. Suppose that both firms engage in Cournot competition in a third-country market. Nash
subsidy equilibrium is characterized by positive export subsidies in both exporting countries. The equi-
librium outputs, prices, firms’ profits and social welfare are, respectively, as follows.
xCi =
2
4 + 2b− b2 , p
C
i =
2− b2
4 + 2b− b2 , (9a)
piCi =
4
(4 + 2b− b2)2 , W
C
i =
2(2− b2)
(4 + 2b− b2)2 . (9b)
[The price-price game]
Now, we consider the case of Bertrand type competition in the product market. In this case, given
the competition mode determined in the first stage, Bertrand competition, in the second stage of the
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game each government chooses export subsidy/tax level as the strategic variable and in the final stage
each firm engage in simultaneous price competition to maximize its profits.
The problem of firm i in the third stage is maxpi pii(pi, pj ; si), which yields its firm i’s price re-
sponse function as RBi (pj ; si) = (1 − b + bpj − si)/2 where the superscript ‘B’ denotes the Bertrand
competition. The response function RBi (pj ; si) is upward (downward) sloping in the price space, if b is
positive (negative). By solving the system of the two reaction functions, we obtain equilibrium prices,
quantities, and profits under the Bertrand competition mode as a function of si and sj ;
pBi (si, sj) =
(2 + b)(1− b)− bsj − 2si
4− b2 , x
B
i (si, sj) =
(2 + b)(1− b) + sj(2− b2)− bsi
(1− b2)(4− b2) , (10)
piBi (si, sj) = pii[p
B
i (si, sj), p
B
j (si, sj); si] =
[
xBi (si, sj)
]2
, (11)
WBi (si, sj) = pii[p
B
i (si, sj), p
B
j (si, sj); si]− sixBi (si, sj). (12)
Analogously to the Cournot case, in the second stage, each government chooses si to maximize its
social welfare WBi (si, sj). Differentiating W
B
i (si, sj) with respect to si gives
dWBi
dsi
=
dpii
dpj
dpBj
dsi
− sidx
B
i
dsi
=
−b2(pBi + si)
(1− b2)(4− b2) − si
2− b2
(1− b2)(4− b2)(< 0 when si = 0), (13)
where the first term (dpii/dpj)(dp
B
j /dsi) in the second expression of the equation represents the cross
effects of export subsidy on the profits via rival firm’s price change, and the second term si(dx
B
i /dsi)
represents the subsidy payments increase due to the home firm’s output change caused by export
subsidy. Regardless of the nature of goods, the cross effect of export subsidy on profits is negative
under Bertrand competition mode.
Apparently, the social welfare of country i is decreasing in export subsidies si at free trade, i.e.,
[dWBi /dsi]si=0 < 0, indicating that a marginal decrease in the subsidy (i.e., marginal increase in
export tax) will increase welfare. The first-order conditions for both governments define the two
reaction functions in the policy space, i.e., si(sj) = −[b2(1−b)(2+b)+b3sj ]/4(2−b2), i, j = 1, 2; i 6= j.
Solving these two reaction functions simultaneously yields
sBi = s
B
j = s
B =
−b2(1− b)
4− 2b− b2 < 0, (14)
which is consistent with the finding of Eaton and Grossman (1986) in the sense that export tax is an
optimal trade policy in Bertrand competition.
Clearly, the Cournot and Bertrand differ in detail. As is well known, outputs are typically strategic
substitutes under Cournot competition, giving rise to an incentive to subsidize. On the other hand,
prices are typically strategic complements under Bertrand competition, giving rise to an incentive to
tax exports. In our paper, we confirm the above results hold true irrespective of whether goods are
substitutes (b > 0) or complements (b < 0).
Substituting sB of Eq. (14) into Eqs. (10) to (12), we can obtain the equilibrium prices, quantities,
firms’ profits, and welfare under the Bertrand competition when optimal trade policies are introduced
by the both governments. The following lemma is immediate.
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Lemma 2. Suppose that both firms engage in Bertrand competition in a third-country market. Nash
equilibrium in a trade policy game is characterized by negative export subsidies, i.e., export tax, in both
exporting countries. The equilibrium output, price, firms’ profit and social welfare are given by
xBi =
2− b2
(1 + b)(4− 2b− b2) , p
B
i =
2(1− b)
4− 2b− b2 , (15a)
piBi = (1− b2)(xBi )2 =
(1− b)(2− b2)2
(1 + b)(4− 2b− b2)2 ,W
B
i = p
B
i x
B
i =
2(1− b)(2− b2)
(1 + b)(4− 2b− b2)2 . (15b)
[The quantity-price game]
Consider the case where, in the first stage, the firm i chooses the quantity while the rival firm chooses
price as their strategic variables for product market competition. So, the modes of product market
competition are asymmetric. Although there are two possible games, (quantity-price) game and
(price-quantity) game, in this regime, it is sufficient to analyze either of these two cases of asymmetric
competition, because firms are otherwise identical. In the quantity-price game, the demand functions
the firm i and firm j face are given by pi = 1− b+ bpj − (1− b2)xi and xj = 1− bxi − pj respectively.
We can rewrite the problems of firms i in the third stage as maxxi pii(xi, pj ; si) while that of firm j as
maxpj pij(xi, pj ; sj), respectively
5.
From the first-order conditions, dpii/dxi = 0 and dpij/dpj = 0, we get the reaction function
RQi (pj , sj) = (1− b+ bpj + si)/2(1− b2) for firm i and RPj (xi, sj) = (1− bxi− sj)/2 for firm j. Clearly,
it holds that ∂RQi /∂pj > 0(< 0) and ∂R
P
j /∂xi < 0(> 0) if b > 0(< 0). Therefore, in an asymmetric
competition mode, the quantity-setting firm i perceives that xi and pj are strategic complements,
while the price-setting firm j perceives those variables as strategic substitutes if b > 0, and vice versa
if b < 0. Solving the system of the two reaction functions in the asymmetric competition mode, we
obtain the third stage equilibrium outputs, prices and profits as functions of si and sj ;
xQi (si, sj) =
2− b+ 2si − bsj
4− 3b2 , p
Q
i (si, sj) =
(2− b)(1− b2)− bsj(1− b2)− si(2− b2)
4− 3b2 , (16)
xPj (si, sj) =
(2 + b)(1− b)− bsi + sj(2− b2)
4− 3b2 , p
P
j (si, sj) =
(2 + b)(1− b)− 2sj(1− b2)− bsi
4− 3b2 , (17)
piQi (si, sj) = pii[x
Q
i (si, sj), p
P
j (si, sj); si], pi
P
j (si, sj) = pij [p
P
j (si, sj), x
Q
i (si, sj); sj ], (18)
WQi (si, sj) = pi
Q
i (si, sj)− sixQi (si, sj), WPj (si, sj) = piPj (si, sj)− sjxPj (si, sj), (19)
where superscript ‘P ’ and ‘Q’ denote the price-setting firm and the quantity-setting firm, respectively,
in the asymmetric competition mode. In the second stage of the game, the optimization problems
of respective governments are as maxsi W
Q
i (si, sj) for country i and maxsj W
P
j (si, sj) for country j.
5Note that the specific form of profit functions of firm i and firm j are asymmetric depending on control variable that
each firm chooses. Profit function of quantity-setting firm i is given by pii(xi, pj ; si) = (pi + si)xi where pi = pi(xi, pj)
is firm i’s indirect demand function, and firm i chooses xi for any given pj to maximize pii. On the other hand, profit
function of price-setting firm is pij(xi, pj ; sj) = (pj + sj)xj where xj = xj(pj , xi) is firm j’s direct demand function, and
firm j determines pj given to maximize pij .
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Differentiating WQi (W
P
j ) with respect to si(sj) gives
dWQi
dsi
=
dpii
dpj
dpPj
dsi
− sidx
Q
i
dsi
=
−b2
4− 3b2x
Q
i −
2si
4− 3b2 (< 0 when si = 0), (20a)
dWPj
dsj
=
dpij
dxi
dxQi
dsj
− sj
dxPj
dsj
=
b2
4− 3b2x
P
j − sj
2− b2
4− 3b2 (> 0 when sj = 0). (20b)
It is noteworthy that the cross effects of export subsidy on firm’s profits, the term (dpii/dpj)(dp
P
j /dsi)
in Eq. (20a), are negative if the corresponding firm competes in terms of quantity taking the rival’s
price as given, while those effects, the term (dpij/dxi)(dx
Q
i /dsj) in Eq. (20b), are positive if the
corresponding firm competes in terms of price taking the rival’s quantity as given. And this holds true
irrespective of the nature of goods.
Note that [dWQi /dsi]si=0 < 0 and [dW
P
j /dsj ]sj=0 > 0, implying that under asymmetric competition
mode, it is optimal for the government to induce the price-setting (quantity-setting) firm to be more
(less) aggressive in the product market by providing subsidy (imposing tax) on their exports. The
intuitive explanation is as follows. If the price-setting firm makes an aggressive behavior, for example,
by price cutting, then the quantity-setting rival firm responds by producing less in the market. For
any given price level, lower output of rival leads to higher profits of the price-setting firm. On the
other hand, if the quantity-setting firm makes a less aggressive behavior in the market, for example,
by reducing its sales, then the price-setting rival firm responds by charge a higher price. For any given
output level, higher price setting of rival firm leads to higher profit of the quantity-setting firm.
Solving these two problems simultaneously, i.e., dWQi /dsi = 0 and dW
P
j /dsj = 0, we get the
optimal subsidy/tax level of each country under asymmetric modes of product market competition as
follows6.
sQi =
−b2(1− b)(4 + 2b− b2)
16− 20b2 + 5b4 < 0, s
P
j =
b2(4− 2b− b2)
16− 20b2 + 5b4 > 0. (21)
By comparing sQi and s
P
j in Eq. (21) with s
B in Eq. (14) and sC in Eq. (8), we obtain that
| sQi | − | sB |=
4b4(1− b)(2− b2)
(4− 2b− b2)(16− 20b2 + 5b4) > 0, (22a)
sPj − sC =
4b4(2− b2)
(4− 2b− b2)(16− 20b2 + 5b4) > 0. (22b)
Proposition 1. Suppose that a home and a foreign firm both export to a third-country market. The
optimal trade policy in a Cournot (Bertrand) competition mode is export subsidy (tax); i.e., sC > 0
and sB < 0. In an asymmetric competition mode, the optimal trade policy for the price-setting firm
is export subsidy while that for the quantity-setting firm is export tax; i.e., sQ < 0 and sP > 0. Fur-
thermore, the magnitude of export subsidy (tax) in an asymmetric competition is greater than that in
a Cournot (Bertrand) competition; i.e., sP > sC and | sQi |>| sB |.
6From the respective first order condition, we can obtain the reaction function of each government in the policy space;
i.e., si(sj) = −[b2(2− b) + b3sj ]/4(2− b2) for country i and sj(si) = [b2(2 + b)(1− b)− b3si]/4(1− b2)(2− b2) for country
j.
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Substituting sQi and s
P
j in Eq. (21) into Eqs. (16) to (19), we obtain the equilibrium prices, quanti-
ties, profits, and social welfare when optimal trade policies are introduced by the governments in this
competition mode. The following lemma is immediate.
Lemma 3. Suppose that firms differ in terms of their strategic variables for the product market
competition. That is, with regard to firm’s choice of strategic variables, one firm chooses price and the
other chooses quantity. In this asymmetric competition mode, if optimal trade policies as in Eq. (21)
are introduced by the governments, then the equilibrium output, price, firms’ profit and social welfare
are given by
xQi =
2(1− b)(4 + 2b− b2)
16− 20b2 + 5b4 , x
P
j =
(2− b2)(4− 2b− b2)
16− 20b2 + 5b4 , (23a)
pQi =
(1− b)(2− b2)(4 + 2b− b2)
16− 20b2 + 5b4 , p
P
j =
2(1− b2)(4− 2b− b2)
16− 20b2 + 5b4 , (23b)
piQi = (1− b2)(xQi )2 =
4(1− b)2(1− b2)(4 + 2b− b2)2
(16− 20b2 + 5b4)2 , pi
P
j = (x
P
j )
2 =
(2− b2)2(4− 2b− b2)2
(16− 20b2 + 5b4)2 ,
(24a)
WQi = x
Q
i p
Q
i =
2(1− b)2(2− b2)(4 + 2b− b2)2
(16− 20b2 + 5b4)2 , W
P
j = x
P
j p
P
j =
2(1− b2)(2− b2)(4− 2b− b2)2
(16− 20b2 + 5b4)2 .
(24b)
Comparing the equilibrium outcomes under three possible competition modes given in Lemmas 1, 2,
and 3, we obtain the following Lemma.
Lemma 4. There are three different types as competition modes depending on the choice of strategic
variable: Cournot, Bertrand and asymmetric competition mode. If optimal trade policies are introduced
under each potential modes, then the following relationship holds among equilibrium values under each
competition mode.
xQi < x
C
i < x
B
i < x
P
i , and p
B
i < p
P
i < p
Q
i < p
C
i if b > 0,
xCi < x
Q
i < x
P
i < x
B
i , and p
P
i < p
B
i < p
C
i < p
Q
i if b < 0. (25)
With regard to above rankings about equilibrium outputs and prices, two points are noteworthy. The
first point is that Singh and Vives (1984)’s ranking of equilibrium outputs and prices under Cournot
and Bertrand competition hold true even in the presence of optimal trade policies by both countries,
i.e., xCi < x
B
i and p
B
i < p
C
i . Firms have less capacity to raise prices above marginal cost in Bertrand
competition, because, in a standard oligopoly setting, firms perceive a higher elasticity of demand
under Bertrand competition than under Cournot competition. Although optimal trade policy such
as export subsidy (resp. tax) under Cournot (resp. Bertrand) competition changes the outputs and
prices, those policies do not change the rankings of free trade equilibrium outputs and prices under
Cournot and Bertrand competition modes, implying that quantities are lower and prices higher in
Cournot than in Bertrand competition irrespective of the nature of goods.
The second point is that, comparing equilibrium outputs and prices under asymmetric competition
with those under Cournot or Bertrand competition, xCi < x
P
i and p
P
i < p
C
i hold if optimal trade policy
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is export subsidy while xQi < x
B
i and p
B
i < p
Q
i hold if optimal trade policy is export tax. The intuition
is as follows. The firm receives greater subsidy when it chooses price rather than quantity taking as
given the rival’s quantity; sCi < s
P
i , which leads to higher output and lower price, that is, x
C
i < x
P
i
and pPi < p
C
i . A higher export subsidies forces firm to be more aggressive in determining the output
level. On the other hand, the firm is levied greater tax when it chooses quantity rather than price
taking as given rival’s price; | sBi |<| sQi |. This leads to less output and higher price when it chooses
quantity in the asymmetric mode compared with choosing price in Bertrand competition mode, that
is, xQi < x
B
i and p
B
i < p
Q
i .
For the analysis of endogenous choice of contract mode in the next section, we define ∆x
P |Q
i and
∆x
P |P
i as follows:
∆x
P |Q
i (≡ xPi − xCi ) =
b4(4− b2)
(4 + 2b− b2)(16− 20b2 + 5b4) > 0, (26a)
∆x
P |P
i (≡ xBi − xQi ) =
b4(4− 3b2)
(1 + b)(4 + 2b− b2)(16− 20b2 + 5b4) > 0, (26b)
where ∆x
P |Q
i denotes firm i’s output change through shifting its strategic variable from quantity to
price given that rival firm, firm j, chooses quantity as its strategic variable. Similarly, ∆x
P |P
i shows a
change in the output of firm i through shifting its strategic variable from quantity to price given that
rival firm chooses price as a strategic variable. Apparently, both ∆x
P |Q
i and ∆x
P |P
i are positive from
Lemma 4. Because firms are otherwise identical, it holds that ∆x
P |Q
i = ∆x
Q|P
j and ∆x
P |P
i = ∆x
P |P
j .
4 The Choice of Competition Mode in the First Stage
We now discuss the choice at the first stage. Table 1, by regarding firms’ payoffs as their profits,
summarizes the game in this stage, where both firms have two strategies with regard to their contract
mode: quantity (Cournot) and price (Bertrand).
Table 1: The Firms’ Choice of Competition Mode
i \ j Quantity Price
Quantity piCi , pi
C
j pi
Q
i , pi
P
j
Price piPi , pi
Q
j pi
B
i , pi
B
j
Since firms are symmertic, we can easily see that piCi = pi
C
j , pi
B
i = pi
B
j , pi
Q
i = pi
Q
j and pi
P
i = pi
P
j . From
the table, we have
∆pi
P |Q
i (≡ piPi − piCi ) = (xPi + xCi )(xPi − xCi ) = (xPi + xCi )∆xP |Qi > 0, (27a)
∆pi
P |P
i (≡ piBi − piQi ) = (1− b2)(xBi + xQi )(xBi − xQi ) = (1− b2)(xBi + xQi )∆xP |Pi > 0. (27b)
where ∆pi
P |Q
i (resp. ∆pi
P |P
i ) denotes profit change of firm i(i = 1, 2) through shifting its strategic
variable to price from quantity, given that rival firm chooses quantity (resp. price) as its strategic
variable. Thus, the signs of both ∆pi
P |Q
i and ∆pi
P |P
i are positive from Eqs. (26a) and (26b). From
Eqs. (27a) and (27b), the following proposition is immediate.
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Proposition 2. Suppose that a home and a foreign firm both export to a third-country market under
either the export subsidy or tax. In this case, choosing a Bertrand strategy is the dominant strategy
for both firms irrespective of the nature of the products and thus the Nash equilibrium of firms’ choice
of competition mode is (price, price), i.e., Bertrand competition.
Proposition 2 is straightforward from Lemma 4. Suppose that the rival firm (for example, firm j)
chooses quantity as a strategic variable. In this case, firm i receives greater subsidy by choosing price
variable rather than choosing the quantity as its rival; sCi < s
P
i , which leads to higher output of firm i
compared to the case of choosing the quantity. That is, xCi < x
P
i . Since profits are positively related
to output in equilibrium, this implies that piCi < pi
P
i . Suppose that, on the contrary, the rival firm j
chooses price as a strategic variable. In this case, firm i can pay lower export tax by choosing price
variable like its rival rather than by choosing the quantity; sQi < s
B
i < 0; leading to higher output of
firm i compared to the case of choosing the quantity, i.e., xQi < x
B
i . Since profits are positive function
of output in equilibrium, piQi < pi
B
i holds. Thus, each firm prefers choosing price variable to choosing
quantity variable irrespective of whether goods are substitutes or complements.
In a duopoly setting, Singh and Vives (1984) showed that choosing the quantity (price) is a
dominant strategy for each firm if the goods are substitute (complements). We obtain a quite different
results from Singh and Vives (1984) when optimal trade policies are introduced by both countries.
In our model, where both countries introduce optimal trade policy, choosing a price contract is a
dominant strategy for both firms irrespective of whether goods are substitutes or complements. These
results indicate that the introduction of trade policy by governments may change the competition
mode from Cournot to Bertrand when goods are substitutes, and that Bertrand model should be used
more in the strategic trade policy model.
However, here, we should note that the endogenously determined Bertrand competition is not
Pareto superior compared to Cournot competition. From Eqs. (9b) and (15b), we get
piCi − piBi =
b2
Ψ
(64− 96b2 + 8b3 + 40b4b5 − 5b6 + b7) > (<)0 (28)
⇔ b ∈ (−0.9732, 1)[b ∈ (−1,−0.9732)].
where Ψ ≡ (1 + b)(4 + 2b − b2)2(4 − 2b − b2)2 > 0. Above Eq. (28) suggests that if goods are not
sufficiently close complement, that is, b ∈ (−0.9732, 1), then piCi > piBi holds. Consequently, from
the aspects of both firms, the endogenous determination of contract, Bertrand competition, might be
Pareto inferior regardless of the nature of goods. In other words, if b ∈ (−0.9732, 1), each firm faces
prisoner’s dilemma situation irrespective of whether goods are substitutes or complements. However,
if b ∈ (−1,−0.9732), then piCi < piBi , implying endogenously determined Bertrand-type price competi-
tion is Pareto superior and prisoner’s dilemma does not occur. The following proposition is immediate.
Proposition 3. Suppose that a home and a foreign firm produce differentiated goods and export to
a third-country market under either the export subsidy or tax. (i) In this case, choosing a Bertrand
strategy is the dominant strategy for both firms irrespective of the nature of the products and thus
the Nash equilibrium of firms’ choice of competition mode is (price, price), i.e., Bertrand competi-
tion. (ii) If goods are not sufficiently close complement, i.e., b ∈ (−0.9732, 1), then the prisoner’s
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dilemma situation arises. That is, firms i and j are both better off if they choose Cournot competition
instead of Bertrand competition. On the other hand, if goods are sufficiently close complement, i.e.,
b ∈ (−1,−0.9732), then Bertrand competition is Pareto superior and thus prisoner’s dilemma does not
occur.
Next, we consider the welfare effects of contract mode choice. Comparing the equilibrium outcomes
under Bertrand competition with that under Cournot-type quantity competition, from Eqs. (9b) and
(15b), we get
WCi −WBi = 4(2− b2)b5Ψ−1 > (< 0) iff b > (<)0, (29)
implying that social welfare is larger (resp. smaller) in Cournot competition than in Bertrand com-
petition if goods are substitutes (resp. complements). This is quite straightforward considering that
social welfare equals firm’s operating profits7 in the absent of domestic consumption, i.e., Wi = pixi.
The intuitive explanation is as follows.
Suppose that goods are independent, i.e., b = 0. In this case, each firm has a monopoly position in
its product market and thus no interaction occur between firms. And the pursuit of private profits by
the monopolist coincides with welfare maximization, implying that optimal trade policy is free trade.
In a monopoly position, profit maximizing prices are the same whether it is determined in terms of
price or quantity; pCi = p
B
i , implying W
C
i = W
B
i .
Now suppose that goods are not independent. We confirmed from Eq. (25) that pBi < p
C
i holds
irrespective of the nature of goods. For firms, if goods are substitutes (i.e., b > 0) low prices mean low
profitability, and Cournot profits are larger than Bertrand profits, implying that WBi < W
C
i . However,
if goods are complements (i.e., b < 0), the story differs. Since lower prices extend the market size,
firm’s operating profits could be larger under Bertrand competition than under Cournot competition,
implying that WBi > W
C
i
Combining Eq. (29) and Proposition 3 provides following Table 2, which summarizes the relation-
ship among the nature of goods, endogenously determined competition mode, firms’ profits and social
welfare.
Table 2: The relationship among good’s nature, competition mode, profits and welfare
Nature of goods Endogenous Optimal Firms’ profits Social
competition mode trade policy welfare
b ∈ (0, 1) Bertrand Export subsidy piBi < piCi WBi < WCi
substitutes Prisoner’s dilemma
b ∈ (−0.9732, 0) Bertrand Export tax piBi < piCi WBi > WCi
complements Prisoner’s dilemma
b ∈ (−1,−0.9732) Bertrand Export tax piBi > piCi WBi > WCi
highly complements No Prisoner’s dilemma
7In usual, operating profits means sales revenue net of production costs. However, in our model, since marginal
production costs are assumed to be zero, firm’s operating costs equal its revenue.
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5 The Effects of Free Trade
Now, let us turn to the case where both country i and country j do not use any trade policies, that is,
si = sj = 0. For example, this is the case where all the three countries form a free trade agreement.
In this case, the second stage of choosing optimal trade policy is ruled out from the original model,
and thus the game is transformed into two-stage game. In the first stage each firm simultaneously
decide whether to compete in terms of price or in terms of quantity and, in the final stage, depending
on the mode of competition chosen in the first stage, firms engage in product market competition to
maximize its profits. Basically, except for social welfare, this model coincides with Singh and Vives
(1984), where social welfare consists of consumer surplus as well as producer surplus.
Substituting si = sj = 0 into Eqs. (4), (5), and (6) for Cournot competition, Eqs. (10), (11), and
(12) for Bertrand competition, and Eqs. (16), (17), (18), and (19) for asymmetric competition, we
obtain the free trade equilibrium outcomes under each competition mode. Table 3 below provides the
market equilibriums under each competition mode. The free trade equilibriums are distinguished by
“∧”.
Table 3: Equilibrium Values under Free Trade(si = sj = 0)
Cournot Bertrand Asymmetric Competition
xˆCi = pˆ
C
i =
1
2+b xˆ
B
i =
1−b
2−b , pˆ
B
i =
1
(1+b)(2−b)
xˆQi =
2−b
4−3b2 , xˆ
P
j =
(1−b)(2+b)
4−3b2
pˆQi =
(2−b)(1−b2)
4−3b2 , pˆ
P
j =
(1−b)(2+b)
4−3b2
pˆiCi = Wˆ
C
i pˆi
B
i = Wˆ
B
i = (1− b2)(xˆBi )2 pˆiQi = WˆQi = (1− b2)(xˆQi )2 = (1−b
2)(2−b)2
(4−3b2)2
= (xˆCi )
2 = 1
(2+b)2
= 1−b
(1+b)(2−b)2 pˆi
P
j = Wˆ
P
j = (xˆ
P
j )
2 = (1−b)
2(2+b)2
(4−3b2)2
We can easily confirm the well-known Singh and Vives (1984)’s rankings of equilibrium outcomes
under different competition modes. From the free trade equilibrium, we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 5. Suppose that the economies are in free trade (si = sj = 0). It follows from the Table
3 that pˆiPi < pˆi
B
i < pˆi
Q
i < pˆi
C
i and Wˆ
P
i < Wˆ
B
i < Wˆ
Q
i < Wˆ
C
i hold if goods are substitutes (b > 0),
while pˆiQi < pˆi
C
i < pˆi
P
i < pˆi
B
i and Wˆ
Q
i < Wˆ
C
i < Wˆ
P
i < Wˆ
B
i hold if goods are complements (b < 0).
In addition, in the two-stage game it is a dominant strategy for firm i to choose the quantity (price)
contract if the goods are substitutes (complements).
Lemma 5 implies that, in a free trade situation, Cournot competition is a dominant strategy for Nash
equilibrium if goods are substitutes, while Bertrand competition is that if goods are complements.
We confirmed in Proposition 2 that, in the presence of optimal trade policies by governments, firms
choose Bertrand competition in both substitutable and complementary good market. Considering
above arguments, the trade liberalization among countries might bring about the shift in the compe-
tition mode between firms depending on the nature of goods. Following proposition is immediate.
Proposition 4. Trade liberalization such as via free trade agreements brings about a change in the
competition mode from Bertrand competition to Cournot competition if goods are substitutes. However,
if goods are complements, there are no such a change in the competition mode and thus Bertrand-type
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price competition prevails the market.
Proposition 4 implies that trade liberalization among countries may cause a shift in the competition
mode from Bertrand-type to Cournot-type competition especially when goods are substitutes and
that Bertrand model should be used more in the analysis of strategic trade policy when goods are
differentiated.
Next, let us look at the welfare effects of trade liberalization. Comparing the equilibrium outcomes
in the presence of optimal trade policies with that under free trade, we obtain the following Proposition.
Proposition 5. A move toward free trade among countries increases not only profits of firms but also
the welfare of both countries irrespective of the nature of goods. That is,
pˆiCi > pi
B
i and Wˆ
C
i > W
B
i if b > 0,
pˆiBi > pi
B
i and Wˆ
B
i > W
B
i if b < 0.
Proof: It follows from Eq. (15b) and Table 3 that
pˆiCi − piBi =
b2(8 + 4b− 11b2 − 3b3 + 3b4 + b5)
(1 + b)(2 + b)2(4− 2b− b2)2 , Wˆ
C
i −WBi =
(4− b− b2)2
(1 + b)(2 + b)2(4− 2b− b2)2 ,
which are positive if b ∈ (0, 1). In addition, from the same equation and table, we obtain that
pˆiBi − piBi =
(1− b)(8− 4b− 3b2 + b3)b2
(2− b)2(4− 2b− b2)2 , Wˆ
B
i −WBi =
−(1− b)(4− 3b)b3
(1 + b)(2− b)2(4− 2b− b2)2 .
which are positive if b ∈ (−1, 0). Q.E.D.
Proposition 5 can be explained as follows. Suppose that goods are complements. In this case, the
contract mode does not change as trade liberalization progresses and thus Bertrand competition
prevails markets. Moreover, when government intervention is allowed, Nash equilibrium in a trade
policy game is export tax in Bertrand competition. Since trade liberalization (removal of export
tax) increases firms’ output, the firms’ equilibrium profits, which is a positive function of output in
equilibrium, also increases due to the trade liberalization (i.e., pˆiBi > pi
B
i ). In usual, trade policy game
involves a prisoner’s dilemma. In a non-cooperative game in which governments move simultaneously,
the dominant strategy in a Bertrand competition for each government is to impose a tax on its exports.
Consequently, at the Nash equilibrium, both countries use strategic trade policy by imposing an export
tax. However, both countries would be better off if they could cooperate so as to achieve the free
trade regime, i.e., WˆBi > W
B
i .
Next, suppose that goods are substitutes. In this case, the contract mode shifts from Bertrand
to Cournot competition as trade liberalization progresses. We have already found that pˆiBi > pi
B
i
holds irrespective of the nature of goods. In addition, according to Singh and Vives (1984)’s rankings
on equilibrium profits under Cournot and Bertrand regime, pˆiBi < pˆi
C
i holds if goods are substitutes
(Lemma 5). Considering these two inequalities, we find that firms’ equilibrium profits increase by the
regime shift from Bertrand to Cournot competition due to the trade liberalization, i.e., pˆiCi > pi
B
i .
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As to welfare change due to the regime shift of competition mode, we have already found from
Eq. (29) that, if goods are substitutes, then the welfare in Cournot competition is greater than that
in Bertrand, i.e., WBi < W
C
i . Trade policy game in terms of export subsidy also involves a prisoner’s
dilemma. The dominant strategy for each government in a Cournot competition is to subsidize its
exports, implying that at the Nash equilibrium both countries use export subsidy as a strategic trade
policy. However, both countries would be better off if they could cooperate so as to achieve the
free trade regime, i.e., WCi < Wˆ
C
i . Considering these two inequalities, we find that if the goods are
substitutes, countries’ welfare increase by the regime shift from Bertrand to Cournot competition due
to the trade liberalization, i.e., WBi < Wˆ
C
i .
6 Concluding Remarks
Incorporating the third-market model into strategic export policy, we have demonstrated the endoge-
nous choice of strategic variables for prices or quantities. Unlike the industrial organization context, we
have suggested that choosing Bertrand competition is the dominant strategy for both firms regardless
of the nature of goods, which faces a prisoners’ dilemma where both countries are worse off in Bertrand
competition in subsidy regime than under Cournot competition (except for the case where goods are
highly complement). However, from the perspective of the government, Cournot competition is more
efficient than Bertrand competition when the goods are substitutes, and vice versa when the goods
are complements. These results may provide economic implications that from the aspects of firms,
the equilibrium could be Pareto superior (inferior) with government’s intervention of subsidy policy
when the goods are substitutes (complements). Moreover, we find that trade liberalization such as via
free trade agreements brings about a change in the competition mode from Bertrand competition to
Cournot competition if goods are substitutes. However, if goods are complements, there are no such
a change in the competition mode and thus Bertrand competition prevails the market. Hence, even
though a home firm and a foreign firm choose to strategically set prices or quantities in a third market,
a move toward free trade among countries increases not only profits of firms but also the welfare of
both countries irrespective of the nature of goods.
We conclude by discussing the limitations of our paper. We have used the simplifying assumption
that one home and one foreign firm are symmetric. By making this assumption, we do not take into
account any cost or demand difference that may arise from the subsidy regime that occurs between
one home firm and one foreign firm. Moreover, in this paper, it is assumed that symmetric subsidies or
taxes occur in equilibrium. However, there can be existed in the international trade that the optimal
domestic response to a foreign export subsidy is to retaliate with (partial) countervailing duties. If
countervailing duties and import tariffs are set in different ways and for different purposes, we need to
re-examine the relationship between countervailing duties, foreign export subsidies and import tariffs
under imperfect competition (e.g. Collie, 1991; Wang, 2004). Finally, we did not extend our results
by considering nonlinear demand structures. The extension of our model in these directions is left for
future research.
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